Defining power in social psychology by Mazur, Lucas
W. B. Gallie: Essentially contested concepts. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956), pp.
167–198.
For example, one can compare Henri Tajfel’s understanding of the power of the collective within So-
cial Identity Theory with Robert W. White’s understanding of the development of personal agency.
J. Guerrero van der Meijden / K. Wilczyński: Reason and will. Remarks on Augustine’s idea of power.
In: The Idea of Power, ed. by M. H. Kowalewicz, Orbis Idearum. History of  Ideas NetMag 2–1 (2015),
pp. 33–46. Retrieved from www.orbisidearum.net.
1
2
3
DEFINING POWER IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Lucas B Mazur
Francis Hiatt School of Psychology, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, USA 
Lucasbmazur@gmail.com
Orbis Idearum (ISSN: 2353–3900), Vol. , Issue 1 (2015), pp. 101–114
Power is what Walter Bryce Gallie called an essentially contested concept.1 In brief,
we all believe that we know what it is and we could all readily offer up a definition
of our own, however, no consensus exists regarding what it actually is at its core
or how best to definitively define it. It is also easy to see that different fields, by
their very nature, understand power differently; the working definitions of the
construct differ across sociology, anthropology, law, military scholarship, political
science, and economics. There are also stark differences within fields. Within psy-
chology, social psychologists often understand power differently (for example as
social identity), than do personality psychologists (for example as individual
agency).2 Within theology, Augustine placed the human intellect with its insights
concerning the nature of goodness at the core of his understanding of power, some-
thing that was often ignored in subsequent theological discussions.3 Even where a
degree of disciplinary consensus momentarily materializes, its historical contin-
gency is not far away. For example, one can locate many of our contemporary dis-
cussions in the social sciences within larger trends; such as that starting from an
understanding of power focused on the ability to realize one’s own will in the face
of resistance from others (e.g. Weber), through increased attention to its functional
nature (e.g. Parsons), to broader notions such as social capital (e.g. Bourdieu), and
subsequently legitimation-based definitions, which includes the silencing of par-
ticular issues as part of the processes by which certain issues can be deemed “be-
yond debate” (e.g. Lukács). 
Not only is power differently understood across fields and time, but it is also
arguably sensitive to subtle changes in such factors as sensitizing concepts, those
concepts that provide a general sense of reference and guidance to our study of
such constructs as power,4 even informing work conducted on such heavily sub-
ject-driven approaches as Grounded Theory.5 Similarly, the weight we give to par-
ticular Weltbilder influences how we define and engage with the object of study.6
Power looks radically different if we examine it through the lens of gender or age,7
and whether in our exploration of it we value or reject such notions as fantasy8 or
trust.9 Our study of power also looks very different if we understand it to be some-
thing inherently bad or inherently good, or as something that can be studied in
abstraction from such value judgments, as is generally assumed within scientific
research. Larger shifts in our general Weltanschauung also influence our under-
standing of such basic concepts as power, as exemplified in the changes seen in
the wake of the tidal waves caused in our thinking by the division of mind and
body generally attributed to Descartes. This split has been linked to the founda-
tions of the scientific revolution in general and to the scientification of psychology
more specifically.10 It has also been linked to the removal of Aristotelian constructs
with their own telos from much of Western thought11 and to our general embrace
of nominalism and thus to our present focus on efficient, rather than ultimate,
power.12
Despite this conceptual cornucopia, the issue of power is generally approached
in a manner that speaks to a search for definitional certitude and singularity. We
want to know what power really is, at its core. This is not surprising. The construct
is important and, in our ever-shifting conceptual landscape, there is a lot at stake.
In the face of the kinds of shifts mentioned above, as well as those accompanying
more mundane changes in situation, circumstance, goals, relations, etc. we remain
definitionally flexible, embracing varying definitions, at various times, under var-
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ious circumstances, and depending upon our current goals. We remain all the
while, however, tempted to claim definitional certitude and singularity. In
Wittgenstein’s classic example, even if when pushed we are unable to say what
something as simple as a game actually is, we have no trouble playing games and
we do so with a certainty that “this is how the game is played, period.” In other
words, in playing the game we often adjust our understanding of its rules, and at
times, we even change the rules, and yet when it comes to defining such constructs,
we speak with a confidence that distracts from these definitional shifts. Such def-
initional shifts color all concepts, not just those that are essentially contested.13
Even something as apparently straightforward as a river is not always defined as a
river across cultures, geographic space and seasons14 – and yet, like with the notion
of game, this state of affairs generally does not challenge our convictions regarding
our definitional understanding of the construct, river. In other words, these ob-
servations do not undercut the power of definitions, quite the contrary; they speak
to how fundamentally important they are. In summarizing the thinking of Karl
Popper, McGee15 wrote that “the amount of worthwhile knowledge that comes
out of any field of enquiry […] tends to be in inverse proportion to the amount
of discussion about the meaning of words that goes into it.” Such sentiment (like
the more explicitly social approach of Kuhn) reject claims to final definitions (as
was the project of the Logical Positivists), opting rather for powerful, but tempo-
rary, answers to current questions. As Jacob Bronowski eloquently put it, in our
failure to settle on final answers to even the most simple of questions, “what we
fail to find is not truth but certainty; the nature of truth is exactly the knowledge
that we do find.”16
How has social psychology generally capitalized on the power of definitions,
while avoiding the definitional quagmire? At present, there appear to be at least
two ready-made options for social psychologists to adopt: (1) to approach the no-
tion of power as if it were an object, by operationalizing it and treating it as an in-
dependent variable OF study; or (2) to understand power as an analytical lens FOR
the study of social phenomena. While social psychology would seem to be consti-
tutionally able to follow either path, it has generally tended to follow the first op-
tion. We will now briefly explore some of the reasons for the primacy of this
option. 
Defining Power in Social Psychology 103
G. C. Bowker / S. L. Star: Sorting Things Out. Classification and Its Consequences, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press 1999.
M. P. Taylor / R. Stokes: When is a river not a river? Consideration of the legal definition of a river
for geomorphologists practicing in New South Wales, Australia. In: Australian Geographer 36 (2005),
pp. 183–200.
B. McGee: Karl Popper, New York, NY: Viking Press 1973, pp. 50f.
J. Bronowski: The Identity of Man, Garden City, NY: American Museum Science Books 1964, p.
37.
13
14
15
16
POWER AS THE OBJECT OF STUDY
In historically breaking from philosophy and attempting to develop a more “sci-
entific” approach, starting in the 19th century psychology increasingly embraced a
mechanistic view of psychological phenomena, one that searches for efficient causal
connections between quantifiable and measurable variables.17 Writing in the
1930’s, the social psychologist and native of Krakow, Poland, Gustav Ichheiser
commented on this state of affairs as follows: “… social scientists should, in my
opinion, not aspire to be as ‘scientific’ and ‘exact’ as physicists or mathematicians,
but should cheerfully accept the fact that what they are doing belongs to the twi-
light zone between science and literature.”18 Part of the reason Ichheiser’s name
may not be known to you is in part that his skepticism towards this empirically
based approach, as exemplified by this quotation, put him outside what was in-
creasingly becoming the mainstream of social psychology.19
The early study of power generally took a quantitative-capacity approach, mean-
ing that the more power one was understood to have necessarily implied another
having less. Power was generally seen as a zero-sum enterprise, and as the power
over someone (rather than as the power to do something). This approach fit nicely
into the increasingly mechanistic philosophy taken by psychology, and would
blend into the work of early theorists of power writing in the middle of the 20th
century, such as French and Raven, and Thibaut and Kelley.20 These theorists
would largely focus on fate and behavioral control.21 In this spirit, researchers would
produce various typologies of power that could help explain what version of power
might be best plugged into other social psychological formula depending upon
the particular object of study (e.g. be it coercion, expertise, or legitimacy).
More recently, within research on the social cognition of power, this approach
has developed into the notion of outcome control.22 Speaking to the prevalence of
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this approach within the field, Overbeck writes “[t]he outcome control definition
is useful for psychologists because of its tractability and relatively bounded scope.
It is easily manipulated in a laboratory setting and is well suited to meeting the
need for experimental control.”23 This speaks directly to how the larger trends to-
ward mechanization have created methodological pressures favoring certain oper-
ationalizations of the construct. The value of these operationalizations are generally
determined by how well they fit into the cognitive or behavioral formula into
which they are plugged. The fact that its form has become its function within mech-
anistic formulas is perhaps most clearly seen in priming methods in which the
exact content of power is irrelevant, such as commonly used priming techniques
in which research participants are asked to imagine a situation in which they had
(or did not have) power. Such approaches have proven to be valuable to the field
in that they have helped to shed light on many of the powerful and surprising ef-
fects that power can have in our social world. To state this differently, by treating
power as an independent variable that can be turned “on” or “off ” we are gaining
a richer picture of what power can do to many of the “dependent variables” in our
social lives.
When reflecting on power in social psychology, it is important to keep in mind
the contested nature of power. It is easy to expand our understanding of the con-
struct so as to include research on a large number of phenomena, such as stereo-
types, prejudice, negotiations, leadership, decision-making, persuasion, social
capital, or collective identity. There are also a variety of approaches to thinking
about power in addition to the quantitative-capacity views, such as consent-based
perspectives, functionalist approaches, identity based approaches, and personal
power (however, these all also generally tend to share the same basic theoretical
and methodological assumptions discussed above, as they have all arisen out of
the shared history of the field). Similarly, it is important to keep in mind that there
are significant variations in theoretical and methodological approaches to power
in social psychology. Social psychologists can and do work on different levels of
analysis, with some focusing primarily on the power of individuals abstracted from
their social context (e.g. as in the notion of agentic capacity) while others look more
at the relational nature of power (as in power over another) or that bound to col-
lectives (as in the Social Identity Approach). While the study of information pro-
cessing may tend to focus on individuals, work within the framework of System
Justification Theory, Social Dominance Orientation, or the Social Identity Approach
is generally more relational in nature. Certain broader theoretical approaches will
obviously tend to produce research with a certain balance of individual versus re-
lational understandings of power (e.g. a functionalist perspective may tend to favor
its relational nature, while personality psychology may favor a more individual
focus). The combination of these various theoretical emphases with the broader
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mechanistic approach of psychology more broadly has lead to an explosion of re-
search within a variety of niche areas, such as social attention and perception,
stereotyping and self-stereotyping, affect and emotion, the use of heuristics, and
risk taking. There are new and interesting studies emerging all the time. 
We have learned a great deal by the increased precision afforded by the focus
on power as an independent variable that can be used within quantitative experi-
ments. It has however, come with costs. This approach has required us to see the
social world as a series of fixed, measurable variables, and thus we have largely
overlooked various other elements, such as its relational nature and the processes
by which it emerges (and dissipates). This general tendency towards the artificial
but strategic narrowing of the research scope is nicely illustrated by Stanley Mil-
gram’s classic experiments on obedience. While they were widely reported as speak-
ing to straightforward proof of the human tendency to follow authority, and they
largely continue to be taught as such, scholars have been drawing our attention to
the more complex picture that the experiments paint.24 There were numerous ver-
sions of the study run, and considerably more variation in the findings than were
widely reported. However, in his publications this complexity was generally passed
over by Milgram, whose scientific fame is owed largely to his ability to speak the
language of his times; the language of quantified psychological phenomena defined
by their operationalization within controlled experiments of mechanistic cause
and effect.
It has also been pointed out that social psychological research stands to gain a
lot from a more cross-cultural perspective. For instance, its focus on the individual
locus power is arguably in part a product of the “Western” environment in which
it has been studied, something that might look very different were it to be studied
in the “East” where power is often understood in relational and consensual terms.25
Even the more relational approaches within the field, such as the Social Identity
Approach, have been challenged in this respect, particularly the approach’s “West-
ern” focus on relative group status versus the “Eastern” awareness of social net-
works.26 Similarly, the overall division between the approach tendencies of the
powerful and the avoidance tendencies of the powerless may look very different in
cultural contexts where self-control is seen as a sign of power and status. Within
our own culturally-bound thinking on power, the notion that power is understood
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as individual agency rather than sociability may speak to a heavily gendered un-
derstanding of the construct, where stereotypically male traits (individual strength
and assertiveness) are understood to be central to the concept, while stereotypically
female traits (collective bonding and passivity) are understood as being its oppo-
site.
Building on the general tendency to see power as an independent variable de-
fined in quantitative-capacity terms and construed as an objectively measurable
object, experimental findings have been pointing to largely consistent differences
between those who are classified as the “powerful” and as the “powerless.”27 These
two categories of power tend to relate differently to the behavioral and cognitive
dimensions of approach (self-agency or competence) and avoidance (other-profitability
or warmth), with the powerful being more agentic and exhibiting patterns of ap-
proach and the powerless being more sociable and avoidant. Recently however, a
number of findings have suggested that this pattern is not as straightforward as it
would seem. For example, the powerful have been called lazy processors of infor-
mation, but also efficient information processors, both inattentive to the environ-
ment and hyper-attentive to the environment, and rigid adherents to heuristics
and stereotypes, but also flexible in the face of new information. This abundance
of crisscrossing findings has lead to increased attention being placed on situational
and motivational variation in the expression of power. For example, it has been
suggested that power affords greater flexibility in information processing, by al-
lowing the power holder to either deliberately process information or to use quick
information processing heuristics, depending upon their goals and the given situ-
ation. In general, power can be thought of as allowing for greater cognitive and
behavioral situational variability, as in the Situated Theory of Power.28
These developments in the social cognition of power would appear to speak to
the value of additive approaches to defining power, in that various findings can be
compiled to create a more complete picture of the phenomenon: 
It may be less useful to seek a unified definition of power than to focus on sys-
tematic mapping of how effects of power covary with the kind of power stud-
ied; that is, perhaps we are always consigned to study just one limited aspect
of power at a time, but we can do so deliberately and explicitly, using multiple
perspectives and approaches in programmatic research.29
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In some ways this approach resembles compiling a puzzle, with the picture we see
of power being understood as becoming clearer the more pieces we add. The fact
that the pieces are of different shapes and sizes, and that they contain different
colors and patterns, is not a problem but a plus. This approach also speaks to a
potentially powerful generative machine, one that can fuel publications, train new
researchers, and graft itself nicely onto quantitative “outcome-based” or “perfor-
mance-based” funding. What is more, this approach can also encourage what is
simply interesting and thought provoking research. 
What we can also expect from this approach, is that it will guarantee surprises,
not only in the form of novel research findings that can be put together like dif-
fering but complementary puzzle pieces, but surprises that challenge the funda-
mental assumptions with which we are working. As a result of being vested in
particular operationalizations of power, from time to time social psychologists will
be surprised to learn not only that there are other ways to understand power, but
that these different understandings call for qualitative changes to how we think
about the phenomenon. We can see an illustrative example of this in recent dis-
cussions concerning social justice in the light of both the prejudice reduction and
collective action traditions. There is growing evidence that the successful reduction
of intergroup psychological tensions and the increase of positive intergroup affect
can actually help to stabilize systemic inequalities and injustice, something that
has been call the sedative effects or the ironic effects of prejudice reduction.30 The
reduction of prejudiced attitudes is no longer understood to be the panacea to our
societal ills. Similarly, both advantaged and disadvantaged communities may be
motivated to perceive the social system as just, even deeply unjust systems (e.g.
according to System Justification Theory and such early writings as that by Ich-
heiser31). Such findings can arguably not simply be added to our current body of
knowledge, but challenge us to rethink the fundamental assumptions that guide
our research and thinking on power.32 In the case of the sedative effects of prejudice
reduction, they can challenge us to shift many of our basic research foci within
thinking on power and social justice: from focusing on the powerful to focusing
on the powerless; from trying to reduce prejudice to trying to encourage social ac-
tion; from examining intergroup collaboration to examining the roots of resistance;
from concentrating the cognitive processes of the individual to that of the collec-
tive; from focusing on the current moment of study to exploring the historical
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gible outcomes (e.g. economics), etc.
These developments often come as a surprise to the field, in that they are met
with suspicion and resistance; we are surprised to learn that power is not entirely
captured by our contemporary (implicitly “logical positivist”33) thinking. As Ich-
heiser pointed out, we are all heavily influenced by the environments in which we
find ourselves, but it is perhaps ironic that we as social psychologists are often the
last to notice this in our own thinking.34 This has been pointed to as a partial ex-
planation of why social psychologists so often put forward research findings re-
garding what they take to be the “surprising” situational influences on cognition
or behavior.35 In promulgating an early version of the fundamental attribution error,
by which we attribute the action of others to their inherent qualities and not to
the situation, Ichheiser was careful to point out that this is most likely an artifact
of our cultural focus on individuality,36 thus anticipating the cross-cultural chal-
lenges the fundamental attribution error would eventually face.37
It is not so much that we don’t yet have enough of the pieces to see the bigger
picture. More pieces arguably won’t help. It is precisely our ability to rip out sin-
gular pieces of the puzzle, ignoring all the rest, that provides this approach with
its utility. As Jacob Bronowski wrote, 
This is the paradox of imagination in science, that it has for its aim the impov-
erishment of imagination. By that outrageous phrase, I mean that the highest
flight of scientific imagination is to weed out the proliferation of new ideas. In
science, the grand view is a miserly view, and a rich model of the universe is
one which is as poor as possible in hypotheses.38
The notion that the shortcomings of our “scientific” study of power can be ad-
dressed by triangulating in on the concept additively misses this crucial point; that
mechanistic operationalization is powerful not such much in that it gets us to what
power really is, but in its ability to in effect ignore the infinite possibilities of what
else it could be. This approach can help shed light on the workings of the other
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puzzle pieces (or their various combinations), but it does not necessarily bring us
closer to seeing some sort of absolute larger picture, that is, understanding what
power is at its core. 
What is more, the drive towards new research to fill in the gaps in our knowl-
edge creates a motivation towards “fact collecting” that can obscure the ideological,
and variable nature of the foundations on which such approaches rest. Returning
once again to Ichheiser, a psychology that does not take into account the uncon-
scious ideological and cultural influences on it own research “is in great danger of
becoming a victim of a pseudo empiricism, which […] may be very well bolstered
by pseudo verifications. And no refined statistical methods will be of any help if
the original data are already distorted and falsified by those misinterpretations.”39
Additive approaches can also lead to “classificatory ad hoc-ery,” with the resulting
models creating haphazard classificatory boxes into which we place fragmented
pieces of our actual experience of power, a tendency that can make its initial goal
of analytical generalization more difficult.40
It is often difficult to see how ideology shapes our construal of fact, something
that is particularly difficult in the case of quantification and measurement with
their assumptions of objectivity.41 The very notion of objectivity arose historically,
and radically changed how we see the world, including how we approach scientific
theorizing and what we understand to count as evidence.42 It aims at separating
the researcher from the object of study, with intercourse between the two occurring
only via ostensibly neutral techniques and tools (their human creation being gen-
erally ignored). This historical shift in thinking has lead to tremendous advances
in knowledge, and yet it is not at all neutral in speaking only to objective “facts.”
Rather, in highlighting certain approaches (not just findings) it can also in effect
silence other approaches (and potential results). A classic example of such scientific
housecleaning is the removal of introspection from psychological research at the
turn of the 19th century, something that had been at the core of psychology since
its beginnings.43 However, given the fundamental importance of phenomenolog-
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ical experience to the very notion of psychology,44 such concepts cannot be entirely
exorcised from the field, as can be seen, for example, with introspection’s subtle
return to psychological research in work on such fundamentally important notions
as well-being45 and both pain46 and pleasure.47
POWER AS A LENS FOR THE STUDY OF OUR SOCIAL WORLD
As discussed above, the mechanistic approach to the study of our social world can
save us from sinking over our heads in the “definitional quagmire” by providing
useful, operational definitions. Rather than taking this increasingly myopic ap-
proach, however, others have gone in the opposite direction; opting to conceptu-
alize key constructs not as objects of analysis, but rather as intellectual tools that
can be used for analysis. In effect, rather than operationalizing the construct in a
manner suitable for insertion into various causal chains, they conceptualize it as
the lens through which they are examining the world. This approach asks how the
social world might look when examined through the lens of power, and how such
a lens might allow for insights into our social lives that are not afforded us by other
perspectives. This is the fundamental difference between cross-cultural psychology,
which generally treats culture as an independent variable, and some approaches
to cultural psychology such as that advocated by Valsiner48 that see culture as a term
for the overarching semiotic processes that color all meaningful human engage-
ment with the world. Cross-cultural psychology generally sees cultures as things we
can (or cannot) step between, while this version of cultural psychology sees culture
as the socially bound processes of meaning making that we never leave. This ap-
proach can also alleviate definitional overload by elevating the level of analysis. As
the scope of research on power has increasingly widened, some (such as Foucault)
have come to see power as being “everywhere.” In this spirit, it has been suggested
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that power itself might very well be better understood as a broader lens for study,
rather than as the object of study,49 similar to the notions of the economy or cul-
ture. 
In laying out an alternate path to the one suggested by the mechanistic study
of psychological phenomena, Valsiner50 points out three general oversights that
tend to color that approach: (1) the elimination of the dynamic flow of experience
by creating static and measurable constructs, (2) the removal of nested hierarchies,
and their replacement by horizontal causal chains, and (3) the removal the imme-
diate context, often by research methods that are assumed to be “context free.”
Similarly, as mechanistic operationalization is generally built on frozen slices of
time, we tend to overlook the dialogical nature of psychological phenomena as
well as their continual emergence.51 Something similar has been pointed out re-
garding power within the intergroup context, with scholars drawing attention to
how collective identities develop over time and across social interactions, with
power struggles being better studied as social processes rather that static, prede-
termined mechanisms.52
Similarly, while statistical techniques can be very powerful tools that can shed
light on areas of human psychology that we would not see “with the naked eye,”
they are also generally based on numerous fundamental assumptions, such as nor-
mal distribution, consistency, independence of samples, and random sampling.53
Power is generally not, however, conceptualized or studied in a manner that would
reflect a normal distribution, consistency, independence of samples or random ex-
amination. Similarly, just as the psychometric qualities psychological states (e.g.
their measurability on Likert scales) is more assumed rather than supported,54 basic
questions regarding our ability to quantitatively measure power abound. Despite
the fact that such observations arguably challenge the core of psychological re-
search, including that on power, a considerable body of influential research con-
tinues to be produced in this experimental tradition. At the same time, the
abundance of research produced is what also leads to the sense that we are simply
“gathering facts”55 or acting as “butterfly collectors,”56 in other words, putting our
findings on the shelf without really knowing what we are to do with them. 
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In the face of both the productivity of mechanistic research and the kinds of
objections thereto mentioned above, it would seem that social psychology would
be in a unique position to capitalize on both. By definition, social psychology
should be able to illustrate the situated, dynamic and variable nature of power. In
this spirit, early researchers, such as Tajfel, studied relative understandings of power,
not absolute ones. However, as discussed above, this is generally not the approach
the field has taken. Work on dynamic intergroup identities and relations has largely
embraced static dichotomous identities,57 just as work on power has primarily em-
braced the ostensibly objective study of power within wider mechanistic formula. 
To be fair, empirical research and theorizing on power within social psychology
is certainly much broader and more diverse that what has been quickly presented
here, all the more so the broader one thinks of the concept (including such key
words as social influence, stereotypes, or discrimination). Similarly, important
questions are being asked about how we understand power within our own re-
search. For example, within research on the psychological differences between
those possessing valued resources and those not in possession of them, it has been
suggested that the field should also ask why, when and by whom those resources
are valued in the first place, and how both consensus and conflict constitute
power.58 At the same time, one can see how in searching for answers to such ques-
tions it is easy to be pulled down the proverbial rabbit’s hole, scrambling to address
one question after the other, as if facing the eternal “but why?” of a child, which
both beautifully and horrifically greets each subsequent answer. The two options
to this challenge discussed above, either narrowing our focus or expanding our
focus, would seem to provide a temporary solution; a babysitter who does not
make the source of the “why?” questions disappear, but at least provides us with
some much needed respite. 
CONCLUSION
Like the study of power, the study of economics can take many forms. One such
approach might very well focus on the buying power of the U.S. dollar, discovering
for instance, that a certain combination of coins allows for the purchase of a bus
ticket from a ticket vending machine in a particular city. Such an approach to the
study of the economy would lead to surprise were a Canadian coin to creep into
our pocket, unbeknownst to us, a coin that to our surprise does not work in the
machine. This can pose practical questions (as in, Why does it physically not work
in the machine?), but it can also give rise to more fundamental questions regarding
the nature of the economy in general (Why is its value different? Why isn’t it ac-
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cepted in this particular place? Etc.). Any time we are wedded to particular defi-
nitions or operationalizations, we can expect such surprises. Studying the buying
power of the dollar in a myriad of ways is tremendously important, interesting,
useful and valuable (while a bus ticket may seem trivial, the price of oil or educa-
tion certainly do not). At the same time, an increasing number of such studies
does not necessarily provide a fuller picture of what the economy is in itself, if for
no other reason than that the phenomenon is continuously changing, not only
aside from our study of it, but often precisely as a result of studying it. Such is
also the case with the notion of power.
Given the primacy of quantitative research methods within social psychology,
and especially as interesting findings continue to arise from such research, we can
expect power to be primarily treated as an objectively measurable variable, usually
an independent variable, within wider causal chains. This shift from asking what
power is, to what power does, can temporary alleviate our Cartesian anxiety,59 our
search for ontological certainty in the scientific method, even if in the process it
speeds up the frequency with which we require a fix. This challenge cannot be
remedied by additive approaches alone, as the utility of this method is bound pre-
cisely to the poverty, as Bronowski called it, of the operationalizations it implies.
Power is testable in this manner only by being shrunk into such ostensibly objec-
tive forms, like the economy being tested when thought of in the form of a par-
ticular coin inserted into a particular machine in a particular location. This
approach is incredibly powerful. However, in as far as we expect such an accumu-
lation of facts to lead to the objective definitional core of the construct, we can
also expect that from time to time the rug will be pulled out from under us. 
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